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Essay
A
lthough the threat of pandemic 
inﬂuenza, spawned by 
continuing avian inﬂuenza 
A (H5N1) epidemics, has dropped 
off the front pages, concern among 
experts continues to grow. At the 
end of 2005, only 17 countries had 
H5N1 outbreaks in chickens, ducks, 
or humans [1]. As of September 
2007, the virus has circulated in 60 
countries [1], mutations have been 
reported (for example, in a patient in 
Turkey [2] and another in Thailand 
[3]), and virologists and public health 
ofﬁcials nervously watch clusters of 
probable human-to-human spread 
of the virus, such as in Thailand in 
2004 and Indonesia in 2006 [4]. For 
reasons not fully understood, most 
human cases and clusters of probable 
human-to-human transmission of H5N1 
since January 2006 have occurred in 
Indonesia [5,6].
Recent studies have begun to 
characterize the mutations in H5N1 
that may be a prerequisite for efﬁcient 
human-to-human transmission [7,8]. 
The world needs to monitor each 
new inﬂuenza virus in order to check 
for such mutations, which could 
transform H5N1 into a dangerous 
pathogen easily spread between 
people. How devastating might such 
a transformation be? In an age of 
globalization and commercial air travel, 
estimating how great a toll a lethal 
human-to-human inﬂuenza virus could 
inﬂict is difﬁcult. Estimates of deaths 
from the last great bird-to-human ﬂu 
pandemic of 1918 range from 50 to 100 
million [9], which provides a glimpse of 
the global damage that could be caused 
by a pandemic inﬂuenza accelerated by 
21st century globalization. 
Indonesia’s Refusal to Share 
Viruses
In light of the importance of virus 
monitoring for pandemic inﬂuenza 
preparedness and response, Indonesia’s 
refusal to share samples of H5N1 virus 
with the World Health Organization 
(WHO) for most of 2007 is distressing 
and potentially dangerous for global 
public health. Negotiations with 
Indonesia to resume rapid and open 
virus sharing have proved difﬁcult, with 
Indonesia repeatedly refusing to share 
unless signiﬁcant changes were made 
to allow it greater access to vaccine 
derived from samples it shared with 
WHO [10]. 
Even though Indonesia resumed 
some virus sharing with WHO in 
the second week of September 2007 
[11], the fundamental dispute is not 
resolved. Indonesia’s willingness to 
continue virus sharing may depend 
on the outcome of intergovernmental 
negotiations in Geneva in November 
2007 [12]. At present, prospects for 
overcoming the central disagreements 
do not appear good. We would like 
to suggest a way to break the root 
causes of the impasse, by taking a novel 
strategic approach to pandemic control 
and bringing new partners to the 
pandemic action table.
To begin, we need to understand 
why Indonesia took this radical 
position, and why it has gained support 
from other developing nations, even 
within the Asian inﬂuenza region. 
For the last 50 years, global inﬂuenza 
governance has operated as follows: 
WHO collaborating laboratories 
annually analyze samples of new 
inﬂuenza viruses circulating primarily 
in Asia. A WHO committee then 
determines which strains appear most 
likely to affect human populations in 
the coming months, and manufacturers 
start producing vaccine for those 
strains [13].
Typically some 250–300 million 
vaccine doses are made each year, 
and most of those vaccinated are 
residents of developed countries [14]. 
This inequitable situation creates 
concern, especially with the prospect of 
pandemic inﬂuenza increasing. Thus, 
many political and health ofﬁcials are 
scrambling to ﬁnd a way to increase 
production and equitable distribution 
of vaccine. We are currently limited, 
however, in vaccine technology, 
pharmaceutical industry incentives, 
and credible dissemination strategies in 
many developing countries.
So, as Asian countries have grown 
anxious about H5N1, and witnessed 
up to 100% fatality rates in infected 
chickens [15] and up to 70% mortality 
rates in infected humans [16,17], some 
developing countries have challenged 
the traditional global inﬂuenza strategy 
by asking, “What’s in it for us? We share 
virus samples, and pharmaceutical 
companies make vaccines from them 
that primarily beneﬁt rich countries. 
Without better access to vaccine, why 
should we share virus samples?”
WHO has tried to ﬁnd a reasonable 
answer to that question, offering 
assurance to Indonesia and its 
sympathizers that the status quo will 
change. Scientists are trying to invent 
new vaccines that can protect against 
a broader range of strains, making it 
possible to build stockpiles for future 
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use. In addition, pharmaceutical 
companies are making traditional 
vaccines against the current avian forms 
of H5N1. 
The deeper problem is, however, 
that current pharmaceutical strategies 
for pandemic control basically offer 
protection to a small number of 
developed countries. For the rest of the 
more than 5 billion human beings on 
the planet, technological solutions are 
scarce, if not nonexistent. 
Stockpiling Control Tools in Hong 
Kong
The world needs a strategy to overcome 
the virus sharing impasse and the 
underlying sources of this problem. 
Inﬂuenza is essentially an aquatic bird 
virus naturally found among animals 
that migrate along the Asian ﬂyway 
from Indonesia to Siberia, so targeted 
strategic stockpiling for that region 
makes epidemiological sense. We 
propose that annually updated supplies 
of more than 500 million doses of 
highly speciﬁc inﬂuenza vaccine, plus 
antiviral medicines, protective masks 
and gloves, and germicide washes be 
stockpiled in Hong Kong. 
We select Hong Kong for three 
key reasons: It has demonstrated 
absolute transparency regarding 
disease emergences going back 
several decades, including the initial 
recognition of H5N1 in 1997. Hong 
Kong is also a dynamic center of virus 
research and response, pioneering 
most of what is now known about 
severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) and avian inﬂuenza. More 
importantly, Hong Kong sits in the 
middle of the ecological zone that 
has spawned the bulk of all inﬂuenza 
strains known to have emerged over the 
last three decades.
We advocate that the strategic 
stockpile be fed continuously and its 
speciﬁcity updated based on circulating 
forms of viruses. These objectives 
would be accomplished through an 
Advance Market Commitment (AMC) 
mechanism in which the G-8 nations 
and Asian powerhouses China, India, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Japan set 
aside a fund to guarantee purchase of 
stockpiled products. 
The Asia-Paciﬁc Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC) should 
manage the AMC fund and the 
stockpiled materials in Hong Kong. 
APEC has proven to be one of the most 
dynamic and effective of the world’s 
regional organizations. Through its 
Health Task Force and other activities 
[18], APEC leadership has recognized 
the need to forestall a devastating 
pandemic, and the APEC region 
already shoulders the burden of the 
ongoing H5N1 pandemic. 
APEC has the ﬁnancial and 
management capacity to oversee the 
AMC in a transparent and efﬁcient 
manner, inviting donations from 
wealthy nations and philanthropies, as 
well as from its member states. APEC’s 
political stature also gives it the authority 
to address the operational challenges 
created by the stockpile strategy, such as 
improving Asian developing countries’ 
abilities to effectively distribute materials 
from the stockpile.
Finally, APEC has the diplomatic 
trust and political clout necessary to 
persuade Indonesia and other nations 
in Asia to share new viral samples 
with WHO on an urgent, timely, and 
consistent basis. APEC would rely upon 
WHO’s technical advice in deciding 
when and how to use the stockpile, 
recognizing WHO’s expertise in 
inﬂuenza virology and epidemiology, as 
well as in other emerging diseases.
This proposal raises questions about 
its epidemiological basis, implications 
for equitable vaccine distribution, and 
political feasibility. Epidemiologically, 
H5N1’s spread beyond Asia perhaps 
increases the chances that the feared 
mutation might happen outside 
the APEC region. Although this is 
possible, our proposal relies on what 
most experts think is probable—that a 
pandemic strain is most likely to emerge 
from the Asian region. In addition, 
the APEC stockpile mechanism could 
set a precedent that other regional 
organizations could pursue. 
Creation of the proposed stockpile 
might raise concerns that the AMC 
will exacerbate inequity for non-APEC 
developing countries by making 
stockpiled materials more scarce and 
costly. Again, this possibility cannot be 
dismissed lightly, but the AMC should 
increase global production capacities 
to ﬁll the growth in demand, thus 
offering something existing approaches 
have failed to achieve—serious 
incentives for signiﬁcant, sustainable 
increases in production capabilities. 
This mechanism can even work to 
encourage new capacity building in the 
Asian region.
Breaking the Stalemate
In terms of the political feasibility 
of our proposal, we believe that 
the impasse over virus sharing, 
which threatens global health 
and international security, has to 
be addressed with new political 
strategies and innovative governance 
mechanisms. WHO and many 
countries view pandemic inﬂuenza 
as a security threat [19,20], revealing 
the importance of ﬁnding political 
solutions. Without new approaches 
to bridge the two sides of the dispute, 
prospects are grim and choices more 
drastic. Unresolved, this dispute could 
have two harmful consequences. 
First, it could threaten the improved 
cooperation against infectious diseases 
that has emerged in recent years, and 
splinter global health governance in 
ways that pit developed and developing 
countries against each other across 
a range of issues, from surveillance 
to intellectual property rights for 
pharmaceutical products. 
Second, continued failure to break 
the stalemate may encourage countries 
threatened by the withholding of virus 
samples to pursue high-stakes strategies 
to break the deadlock, perhaps by 
seeking United Nations Security 
Council intervention on the grounds 
that failure to share viruses imperils 
global health security and international 
security. There is no way to predict the 
outcome of putting this issue before 
the Security Council.
The current stalemate poses such 
dangers that allowing the dispute to 
continue to drift and fester undermines 
prospects of ﬁnding solutions to 
the legitimate issues raised on both 
sides. An APEC-based strategic 
stockpile is one way to construct an 
epidemiologically valid and politically 
sensible path to ensuring that 
preparedness for pandemic inﬂuenza 
(and the next SARS or other emerging 
virus) does not disintegrate, leaving 
everyone at risk.  
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